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The Impact of a Cash Transfer Program on Cognitive 
Achievement: The Bono de Desarrollo Humano of Ecuador
*
 
Throughout Latin America, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs play an important role 
in social policy. These programs aim to influence the accumulation of human capital, as well 
as reduce poverty. In terms of educational outcomes, a number of impact evaluation studies 
have shown that such programs have led to an increase in school enrollment, ensured 
regular school attendance and led to a reduction in child labor. Theoretically, such cash 
transfer programs may also be expected to exert a positive impact on students’ test scores, 
but related empirical evidence is scarce. Accordingly, this paper evaluates the impact of a 
cash transfer program, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano of Ecuador, on students’ cognitive 
achievements. The paper uses a regression discontinuity strategy to identify the impact of the 
program on second grade cognitive achievement. Regardless of the specification and the 
sample used, we find that there is no impact of the program on test scores, suggesting that 
attempts at building human capital, as measured by cognitive achievement, require additional 
and alternative interventions. 
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I. Introduction 
Demand-side interventions play an important role in education policy in Latin America. 
Broadly, two types of policies have been implemented in the region - conditional cash 
transfer programs (CCT) and school vouchers. As far as the former are concerned, CCT 
programs started during the 1990s and the main idea of these programs is to provide 
money to poor families, conditional on enrollment and regular attendance of their children 
in school and regular visits to health centers, where their growth is monitored and they 
receive nutritional supplements. In the long run, these programs seek to influence the 
accumulation of human capital, especially amongst youth and children, as a means of 
breaking the inter-generational cycle of poverty. In the short run, CCT programs aim to 
reduce poverty by increasing the income of poor families.  
A number of the CCT programs operating in Latin American countries have been 
evaluated.  While details are provided later, on the education front, a majority of the impact 
evaluation studies have found that CCT programs boost school enrollment and ensure 
regular school attendance. While these are clearly the first steps required to ensure a higher 
level of educational attainment and achievement, if CCT programs are to ensure that 
students accumulate adequate human capital to break the cycle of poverty, then a focus on 
enrollment is not enough.  From a policy perspective it is important to examine whether 
such programs also lead to gains in cognitive achievement.  Higher cognitive achievement 
as captured by test scores, are likely to ensure that a child stays in school for a longer 
duration (higher educational attainment) and are also correlated with labor market success. 
There is a limited literature on developing countries which shows that cognitive 
achievement increases wages and tends to have larger effects than schooling attainment.
1 
While the link between the level of test scores and earnings may be confounded with a 
number of other factors, a more recent literature focuses on gains in tests scores and 
earnings. For example, Jencks and Phillips (1999) show that math test scores gains between 
 
1 See Boissiere, Knight and Sabot (1985) for work on urban Kenya and Tanzania; Alderman, Behrman, Ross 
and Sabot (1996) for work on Pakistan; Lavy, Spratt and Leboucher (1997) for work on Morocco.   2
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th and 12
th grade exert a positive impact on educational attainment and also exert a 
positive impact on earnings nearly a decade after students graduated from high school. 
Rose (2006) shows that employed women who gained one standard deviation more than 
average on math test scores between 8
th and 12
th grade, experience, on average, a 9 percent 
increase in earnings. Her results also show that for women, gains in test scores influence 
the probability of finding employment.
2          
Theoretically, such programs are likely to influence students’ cognitive 
achievements in several ways. On the one hand, there could be a positive impact because 
CCT programs increase attendance rates and higher attendance is likely to lead to higher 
test scores.
3 Cash transfer program induced increases in household incomes may be 
expected to lead to increased food consumption and better nutrition which in turn should 
translate into higher levels of cognitive achievement. Several evaluations have shown that 
these programs are associated with a reduction in the probability that a child works which 
again maybe expected to exert a positive impact on test scores.
4 On the other hand, these 
programs may also have a negative effect on test scores. Increases in school enrollment may 
translate into congested classrooms, which in turn may negatively affect cognitive 
achievement.  Whether such programs exert a positive effect on test scores or whether 
congestion effects dominate, leading to a reduction in learning and test scores is an 
empirical question.   
While there are a number of studies that have examined the effect of CCT 
programs on enrollment, child work and other outcomes, the number of studies evaluating 
the effect of the CCT program on cognitive achievements is scarce. Therefore, the 
 
2 A number of authors have used developed country data to examine the impact of the level of test scores on 
earnings. For example, based on US data, Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) show that the importance of 
mathematics test scores in predicting earnings grew during the 1970s and 1980s. For the same time period, 
Bedard and Ferrall (2003) use international data to compare test scores distributions at age 13 with the 
distribution of subsequent wages and conclude that the trends in the two distributions are related.       
 
3 Bedi and Marshall (1999 and 2002) discuss the link between school attendance and test scores in Honduras. 
In particular, they report that an increase in school attendance by 5 days increases grade 2 mathematics and 
Spanish test scores by about 1.5 points. 
 
4 See Rawlings and Rubio (2003), Caldés, Coady, and Maluccio (2004) and Villatoro (2005) for reviews. 
   3
                                                
contribution of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the Ecuadorian cash transfer 
program (Bono de Desarrollo Humano-BDH) on students’ cognitive achievements. In 
particular, the paper exploits the manner in which the BDH is allocated and relies on a 
regression discontinuity approach to identify the impact of the program on second grade 
cognitive achievement. 
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of the main 
demand side interventions and their impact on educational outcomes in Latin America. 
The third section presents a country background and a program description. The fourth 
section outlines the empirical approach. The fifth section presents the data and descriptive 
statistics while the sixth presents the results. The final section concludes the paper.  
II. Conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America 
The first Latin American CCT program started in 1995 in Brazil under the government of 
the Distrito Federal of Brasilia (Bolsa Escola). Other early experiences include Mexico’s 
Progresa (now re-named Oportunidades), which started operations in 1997. In 1998, Honduras 
restructured a safety net program into a CCT program (Programa de Asignacion Familiar 
PRAF) while Nicaragua started its CCT program in 2000 (Red de Protección Social).
5  
A number of studies have examined the impact of these programs on school 
enrollment, attendance, nutrition and child work.  In particular, experimental designs have 
been used to examine the impact of the CCT programs in Mexico (Skoufias, 2000; Schultz, 
2004; Behrman, Sengupta and Todd, 2005) and Nicaragua (Maluccio and Flores, 2004). In 
the case of Mexico, Schultz (2004) reports that at the primary school level, where 
enrolment rates before program implementation were between 90 and 94 percent, the 
program had a small positive impact with an increase in enrolment of between 0.8 to 1.18 
percentage points for boys and 0.92 to 1.27 percentage points for girls. At the secondary 
level, where the initial enrolment rates were 67 percent for girls and 73 percent for boys, 
the program increased enrolment rates for boys by 6.2 percentage points and for girls the 
 
5 Other countries with CCT programs include, Costa Rica (Superémonos), Colombia (Familias en Acción), 
Argentina (Familias por la Inclusion Social), Uruguay (Proyecto 300), Chile (Chile Solidario), Ecuador (Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano), and Jamaica (Programa de Avance Mediante la Salud y la Educacion).    4
corresponding effect was 9.2 percentage points. Other program effects as reported by 
Skoufias (2000) include, in 1999, a 13 percent increase in median food expenditure, 
improvement in child health (children aged 0 to 5 years were 12 percent less likely to be ill), 
and reduction in child stunting.  Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2005) also report a 
program induced increase in enrollment as well as lower dropout and repetition rates. 
However, in terms of cognitive achievement, Behrman, Sengupta and Todd (2000) find 
that after almost a school year and a half of exposure there is no impact of the program on 
test scores. 
  In Nicaragua, Maluccio and Flores (2004) show that the CCT program increased 
school enrollment amongst children in the age group 7 to 13 by 18 percentage points, led 
to a 23 percentage point increase in attendance (during the previous month) and reduced 
the incidence of child work by 5 percentage points. In addition, the program led to a 5 
percentage point reduction in stunting amongst children aged 0 to 5.  
  Other CCT programs have been evaluated using non-experimental methods. For 
example, Duryea and Morrison (2004) use regression analysis and propensity score 
matching to evaluate Costa Rica’s Superémonos program. Their propensity score estimates 
show that the program increased school attendance for children in the group 13 to 16 by 5 
to 8.7 percentage points but did not have any effect on their work patterns. The effect of 
the program on school performance as measured by the probability of passing a grade 
indicated a 5 percentage point increase for program participants but was not robust to 
changes in estimation method.  Attanasio et al., (2006) use propensity score matching to 
evaluate a CCT program (Familias en Acción) in rural Colombia.  They find that the program 
increased school participation of 14 to 17 year old children by between 5 to 7 percentage 
points, and school enrolment of younger children by 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points. They 
also find that the program was associated with a reduction in the participation of younger 
children in domestic work by about 10 to 12 percentage points.   
While there are differences across countries, the overall pattern emerging from the 
impact evaluation studies that have been conducted in Latin America is that, in general,   5
                                                
CCT programs have led to substantial increases in school enrollment especially for children 
at the secondary school level with more modest effects at the primary level. The programs 
have also led to increases in school attendance and in several cases also led to reductions in 
child work and improvements in health outcomes (for children in the age group 0-5). The 
effects of such programs on measures of school performance such as test scores and the 
probability of passing a grade have not yet been extensively researched and the evidence 
that does exist does not yield clear conclusions.     
III. Country background and program description 
Ecuador is a lower-middle income country, characterized by high levels of poverty and 
inequality.
6 Regarding education, the country has witnessed sharp improvements in the last 
few decades.
7 For example, the average educational attainment of the population aged 
more than 24 years increased from 6.7 to 7.3 between 1990 and 2001. The net enrolment 
rate at the primary and secondary level, increased from 68.6 and 29.5, in 1982 to 88.9 and 
43.1, in 1990 respectively. However, between 1990 and 2001, net enrolment rates for both 
primary and secondary levels stagnated and in 2001 (90.1 percent and 44.6 percent 
respectively) were at the level achieved in 1990. Educational achievement fell and according 
to information from the Ecuadorian System of Educational Achievements Measurement 
(“Sistema Nacional de Medición de Logros Académicos SNMLA”), test scores for mathematics 
and language, which are marked out of 20, decreased from 9.7 and 10.7 to 8.5 and 9 
respectively for the second grade of primary education during the second half of the 1990s. 
A similar deterioration was observed for students in sixth grade and for students in 
secondary school. Repetition and dropout rates also increased during the 1990s.  
Towards the end of the 1990s, in a bid to boost school enrollment amongst the 
poorer segments of the population and to raise achievement the Ecuadorian government 
launched a conditional cash transfer program (Beca Escolar) and a school-meal program 
 
6 In 2004, per capita GDP in constant 2000 prices was US$ 1,435.  Based on the 2001 population census, and 
using the criteria of unmet basic needs, poverty was estimated to be at around 61 percent while based on the 
1999, Living Standards Measurement Survey, the consumption Gini coefficient was 0.47. 
 
7 Compulsory schooling in Ecuador starts at age 5 and ends at 14 and includes one year of pre-school, six 
years of primary school and three years of basic secondary school.   6
(Programa de Alimentacion Escolar). The Beca Escolar program consisted of transferring US$5 
per month per child (up to two children per household), conditional on a child being 
enrolled in school and maintaining a monthly attendance of 90 percent.  
  At about the same time (in 1998), a program (“Bono Solidario”) was also launched to 
compensate poor families for the elimination of gas and electricity subsidies. Initially, the 
program used a self-targeting strategy to target mothers with monthly earnings below 
US$40, people with disabilities and senior citizens. While the immediate political 
justification for this program was to compensate the poor for losses in their real purchasing 
power caused by statutory increases in (heavily subsidized) petroleum and natural gas 
prices, the program quickly took on a life of its own, becoming the government's largest 
social expenditure outside of education, with total transfers equal to about one percent of 
the GDP (León, Vos, and Brborich, 2001). By comparison, public education and health 
expenditures account for two-and-a-half and a bit less than one percent of GDP, 
respectively. The transfer was modest, but not trivial by Ecuadorian standards. At the time 
that the program started, mothers received 100,000 sucres per month, about US$15, and 
senior citizens and people with disabilities received 50,000 sucres. In April 1999, those 
amounts were increased by 50 percent, mostly to account for high inflation. On average, 
the share of Bono Solidario income in total household expenditures was 11 percent in 1999. 
During 2000, the program reached around 1.2 million beneficiary households, representing 
about 45 percent of Ecuadorian households.  
In 2003 the Bono Solidario was reformulated and became a CCT. The program was 
renamed Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) and incorporated both the Bono Solidario and the 
Beca Escolar. The main objective of the new program is to improve the formation of human 
capital among poor families in Ecuador. Education and health are the two components of 
the program. The education component requires children from the ages of 6 to 15 to enroll 
in school and to attend at least 90% of the school days in a month. The health component 
requires children under the age of six to attend health centers for bimonthly medical check-  7
                                                
ups where their growth and development is monitored and they receive nutritional 
supplements and immunization.  
To select beneficiaries, the program uses an individual targeting strategy based on a 
proxy-means test. In particular, program participation is based on an index called Selben, or 
system of selection of beneficiaries of social programs. Selben identifies potential 
beneficiaries of social programs by classifying households according to an unmet basic 
needs index computed using non-linear principal components analysis.
8 Families in 
quintiles 1 and 2, that is, families with a Selben score of less than 50.65 are eligible to 
participate in the program.  Beneficiaries receive a cash transfer of US$15 per month, per 
family which may be compared with the average monthly expenditure of US$100 amongst 
families in the target group. In 2004, the annual budget of the program was US$190 million 
(around 1% of the GDP) and the program covered about 1.1 million households or 40% 
of the population. 
The effects of these various programs have been examined by a number of authors. 
For instance,  Vos et al. (2001) use propensity score matching to show that Bono Solidario 
leads to a 5 percentage point increase in school enrolment. León and Younger (2007) use 
an instrumental variable approach and report that the Bono Solidario had a statistically 
significant but small positive effect on children's nutritional status. Turning to the BDH, 
based on an experimental evaluation design, Schady and Araujo (2006) find that the 
program increased school enrollment for children in the age group 6 to 17 by about 10 
percentage points and reduced child work by about 17 percentage points.
9  In related work, 
Ponce (2008) reports that households receiving the BDH experience a 25 percent increase 
in food expenditure. Thus, consistent with the results from other programs in Latin 
 
8 The index is scaled from 0 (poorest) to 100 (richest). More details on the construction of the Selben index 
are provided later on in the text.  
 
9 Oosterbeek, Ponce and Schady (2008) use an experimental and non-experimental design to show that the 
enrollment effect is heterogeneous and that the increase in enrollment is restricted to children around quintile 
1 (poorest families) while enrollment for children from families around quintile 2 is unaffected by the 
program.   America, the program in Ecuador is associated with an increase in school enrollment, 
improvements in nutritional status and increases in food expenditure.   
IV. Empirical strategy  
As discussed above, during the second half of the 1990s Ecuador recorded a decline in 
cognitive achievements for students in primary and secondary school. The BDH was a 
response to this decline and has the stated aim of increasing human capital formation 
amongst poor families in Ecuador in order to break the inter-generational cycle of poverty. 
While there is ample evidence that CCT programs such as the BDH have been successful at 
raising enrollment and attendance as well as in some cases reducing child work and 
improving nutritional status of children, whether such outcomes also translate into higher 
levels of learning as measured by gains in test scores is not clear.  Given the link between 
gains in test scores and subsequent labor market outcomes, if CCT programs are to meet 
their stated aims it is important to focus not just on enrollment and attendance but also on 
learning.    
  To isolate the effect of the program on students’ test scores, we begin with the 
following educational production function: 
i i i i i u T S f X Y + + + = α β ) ( ,         ( 1 )  
where Yi is the outcome variable (test scores), Ti is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
child lives in a family receiving the BDH and 0 otherwise, Xi is a vector of individual, 
household, school and teacher characteristics, f(Si) is a flexible function (a third degree 
polynomial) of the Selben (Si) index and ui is an unobserved error term.
10 Since program 
participation is not random and purposively targets the poor, it is likely that Ti is negatively 
correlated with the error term ui, and OLS estimates of  , α the main parameter of interest, 
are likely to be downward biased.  
                                                 
  8
10 A potential pitfall of the RD approach is that it assumes that the relationship between the outcome variable 
and the variable that determines treatment is known. If one assumes the wrong functional form, estimates 
can be biased because of model misspecification. If, for example, the relationship is non-linear around the 
cutoff, but the function is specified as linear, then the estimated treatment effect may simply pick up any 
underlying non-linearity in the function (see Jacob and Lefgren 2004; Chay, McEwan and Urquiola 2005). To 
deal with this problem we use a third degree polynomial of the Selben index.   9
                                                
To tackle this problem, we exploit the BDH’s targeting mechanism and rely on a 
regression discontinuity (RD) strategy to isolate the causal effect of the program.
11 As 
stated earlier, program participation is based on the Selben index and is intended only for 
families scoring below 50.65 (So). In other words, assignment to the program depends on 
the value of an observed continuous variable (Selben) relative to a given cutoff point. This 
mechanism generates a highly non-linear relationship between treatment status and the 
Selben index. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship and shows that as the Selben index 
declines there is an increase in the probability of being treated but there is sharp spike at 
the cutoff point of 50.65. Households with a Selben index of less than 50.65 are about 10 
percentage points more likely to be in the treatment group as compared with households 
that have a Selben index of just above 50.65. As illustrated in the figure, the non-linear 
relationship between the Selben index and treatment status provides exogenous variation in 
treatment status which may be used to identify the causal effect of the program.   
  If individuals were assigned to treatment solely on the basis of the assignment 
variable, that is, all those above the cutoff point (So) do not receive the treatment (Ti=0 if Si 
> S0), whereas all those who lie below do (Ti=1 if Si ≤ S0) then T would be deterministic 
and would depend only on the score in the Selben index. Under such circumstances 
(“sharp” discontinuity design), assuming that unobserved characteristics vary continuously 
around the cutoff with the observable characteristics used to determine treatment, the 
program allocation rule replicates random assignment of individuals to treatment status 
around the cutoff point. Accordingly, individuals lying within an arbitrarily small interval 
above and below the cutoff point are likely to have similar observed and unobserved 
characteristics and, restricting the sample to those just below and just above the cutoff and 
 
 
11 The regression discontinuity approach proposed here has often been used to evaluate the effects of 
educational interventions. Examples of such studies include, Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960),  Black 
(1999), Angrist and Lavy (1999), Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (1999), Van der Klaauw (2002), Jacob and 
Lefgren (2004).  comparing test scores of children on either side of the cutoff is likely to yield unbiased 
program effects.
12   
Identifying program impact based on restricted sample OLS estimates assumes that 
program participation is a deterministic function of the assignment rule.  However, this is 
unlikely and as shown in Table 1 there is a fair degree of “fuzziness” in program 
assignment. For about 66 percent of the sample (1721/2595) eligibility and program status 
match, but there are 673 individuals (26 percent) who are eligible but do not receive the 
program and 201 individuals (8 percent) who are not eligible but do receive the program.
13 
Thus, assignment to treatment status depends on the Selben index in a stochastic manner. 
To estimate the treatment effect in the presence of fuzzy discontinuity, following Hahn et 
al. (2001), we adopt an IV approach.  Program participation, or the first stage equation, is 
treated as a function of an instrument (Z), the Selben index (S) and other variables (X).  
The instrument (Z) is based on the decision rule and takes the value of 1 for those scoring 
below the cutoff in the Selben index (50.65) and the value of 0 for those scoring above the 
cutoff. This first stage equation may be written as: 
i i i i i w Z S f X T + + + = γ δ ) (         (2) 
Since the instrument is based on the assignment rule it is likely to be highly correlated with 
program participation (see Figure 1). However, we also need to assume that unobserved 
characteristics that determine student test performance are not correlated with the 
instrument, that is, we assume,  0 ) , | ( = ⋅ i i i i S X u Z E . If this assumption holds then 
consistent program estimates may be obtained by estimating, 
  ,        ( 3 )   i i i i i u T S f X Y + + + =
∧
α β ) (
                                                 
12 That is, OLS estimates of an equation such as , where RS indicates 








i u T S X Y + + + = α δ β
 
  10
13 Leakage occurs mainly because some households who received benefits under earlier intitiatives continued 
to receive benefits through the BDH program, although based on the Selben index they were no longer 
eligible. On the other hand eligible households who did not participate in village-level meetings at the time 
that the Selben was originally being calcuated, although eligible, do not receive the BDH. where 
∧
T  is obtained from (2).
14 Estimates based on (3) provide the average treatment 
effect for those around the discontinuity point, that is, it is the treatment effect for those 
whose participation has been influenced by the assignment rule (instrument). This effect is 
usually termed the local average treatment effect.  
IV.2 Reproducing the Selben index 
The implementation of the RD design is based on the idea that the researcher has 
information on the Selben index and therefore on program eligibility. However, while the 
post-program data that we have has information on outcomes and several other 
characteristics and we know whether families are program participants or not we do not 
know each families score in the Selben index and nor do we have information in the post-
program data on characteristics at the time that the Selben index was actually developed 
and used to determine program participation. Thus, in order to implement the RD strategy 
and replicate the assignment process the first step is to reproduce the Selben index using 
the post-program data. 
The original Selben index was constructed using non-linear principal components 
analysis and a combination of 27 variables. These variables can be classified into the 
following groups: infrastructure (6 variables), demographic characteristics of household 
members (9 variables), educational characteristics of household members (4 variables), and 
household assets (8 variables). The index is scaled from 0 to 100. As already mentioned, 
families scoring below 50.65 were eligible to receive the benefit, while families scoring 
above 50.65 were ineligible. While the Selben is constructed using 27 variables, the post-
program data that we have has information on only 20 of the 27 variables.  
For the construction of the original version of the index, researchers from the 
Technical Secretariat of the Social Cabinet used the 1999 Living Standards Measurement 
Survey (LSMS). The various categories and variables used as well as their respective weights 
                                                 
14 This assumption may not hold if individuals can influence their position relative to the cutoff (Jacob and 
Lefgren, 2004). In our case, this should not be a problem as families do not have any control over the 
calculation of the Selben index and nor are they aware of the scoring procedure. 
  11
 can be seen in Table A1. To replicate the index, we worked with the same survey (LSMS 
1999) using only the 20 variables available in our post-program data. Using the same 
statistical procedure (non-linear principal components), we re-estimated the index to obtain 
the new weights for the restricted set of 20 variables and created a quasi-selben index. The 
variables used as well as their respective weights can also be seen in Table A1. A regression 
of the Selben index on the quasi-selben index shows that the original Selben index can be 
computed based on the quasi-selben index on the basis of the following equation: 
  selben quasi Selben _ * 925 . 0 159029 . 9 + =       (4)   
        (0.14312)  (0.0032) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. The R-squared of the regression is 0.93.  
  Finally, with the new weights for the restricted set of 20 variables and using the 
post-program data we computed the quasi-selben index, while equation (4) was used to 
obtain the Selben index for each family in the post-program data set.  
V. Data  
The data used in this paper were gathered between November 2004 and February 2005, 
which is about a year and a half after the launch of the BDH program, by the Latin 
America Faculty of Social Sciences (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO-
Ecuador). The fieldwork to gather data was very intensive and covered the rural areas of the 
country and the capital Quito and utilized three different instruments. Standardized tests in 
mathematics and language were conducted to gather information on cognitive achievement 
from students in second and fourth grades and for each child the research team obtained 
information on school and teacher’s characteristics and household variables.
15 The test 
scores, as well as school and teacher questionnaires, were filled out in the school, while the 
household questionnaire was filled out at the child’s home. 
 
                                                 
15 This paper present results only for the second grade. The results for the fourth grade are similar and are 
available on request. 
  12
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The second grade sample includes 2,588 children (1,469 in the treatment and 1,119 
in the control group).  The school questionnaire contains information on school 
infrastructure, the number of teachers, the number of students, the number of classrooms, 
availability of books, computers and other school inputs. The teacher questionnaire was 
applied to the teachers in charge of mathematics and language and the survey obtained 
information on the teacher’s education, experience, the type of contract (hired by the 
Ministry of Education or by the school), and the number of training courses attended 
during the last four years. 
The household questionnaire contains information on household assets and 
infrastructure.  At an individual level, the survey contains information on parental 
education levels, marital status and language spoken by household members. In addition, 
employment status, labor conditions and information on income for all those aged above 5 
is gathered. For children between 5 to 17 years old, information on school enrolment, the 
type of school in which a child is enrolled and information on education spending is 
available. Finally, the questionnaire contains information on child’s use of time and record 
the number of hours the child works, helps in housework, watches television and whether 
he or she receives some parental help for homework.  
Table 1 presents selected descriptive statistics based on the complete sample, 
conditional on beneficiary status. As the table shows, there are substantial differences 
between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Beneficiaries have lower test scores (about 10 
percent lower) in mathematics and language and live in families with less educated heads of 
household. Regarding school characteristics, the percentage of children enrolled in schools 
with just one teacher, in schools belonging to the indigenous system and the percentage of 
children attending schools with a part-time principal, is higher amongst beneficiaries as 
compared to non-beneficiaries.
16 While there are no statistically significant differences in 
 
16 The Ecuadorian schooling system consists of two independent components - the Indigenous system, and 
the Hispanic system. Most indigenous students are enrolled in indigenous schools, where Quechua and 
Spanish are taught. Schools with one teacher are generally located in the poorer areas of the country. A full-
time principal implies that the principal takes care of administrative issues and has no teaching 
responsibilities.    14
                                                
terms of access to books and learning guides, there are differences in favor of non-
beneficiaries in terms of access to computers and the internet and school infrastructure.
17 
Turning to teacher characteristics, once again, non-beneficiaries are more likely to be taught 
by teachers with a superior level of education, as well as by teachers contracted by the 
Ministry of Education.
18
To summarize, based on these descriptive statistics, it is clear that children living in 
non-beneficiary families have higher cognitive achievements, they belong to families with a 
higher socioeconomic status, and attend better schools, as compared to beneficiaries. These 
differences are consistent with the targeting strategy of the program and suggest that a 
simple comparison of test scores between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is unlikely to 
yield credible program estimates and that, as in the regression discontinuity approach 
proposed here, credible program estimates are likely to be obtained only after controlling 
for differences in observable (including a flexible function of the Selben index) and 
unobservable characteristics between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.           
VI. Estimates  
Table 3 displays OLS estimates of the effect of the BDH program on tests scores. The 
table contains four specifications. Specification 1 includes child characteristics (sex, age and 
a third-degree polynomial of the Selben index).
19 Specification 2 includes, in addition, 
household variables indicating whether the head of household is illiterate, indigenous, and 
female, as well as a set of variables that captures household composition (including the 
number of individuals in the household in different age groups). Specification 3 expands 
 
17 This index is scaled from 0 to 5, and was computed using indicator variables that take the value of 1, if a 
characteristic is present and 0 otherwise. The index is based on access to teacher housing, potable water, 
electricity, bathrooms and playgrounds. 
 
18 Teachers in Ecuador can be hired by the Ministry of Education (the majority), or by the community and 
the parents and teachers associations.  Teachers with contract from the Ministry enjoy better employment 
conditions. 
 
19 Other child variables available in the data such as the time spent on work, time spent on homework, the 
time spent watching TV and the amount of time parents spend with their children are not included in the 
specification due to endogeneity concerns. However, estimates of the coefficient on T are robust to the 
inclusion of these variables. 
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the specification and includes school characteristics that may have a bearing on cognitive 
achievements (indicator variables for urban, enrollment in a Hispanic school, enrollment in 
a school with one teacher or a multi-grade school, whether the school has a full time 
principal, access to computers, access to the internet, and the number of textbooks and 
learning guides per student), as well as characteristics of the teacher instructing children in 
mathematics and language (age, sex, education level and training, and type of contract). 
Finally, specification 4 includes canton fixed effects. While we present estimates based on 
all four specifications, for the most part we focus our attention on the estimates based on 
the most complete specification (that is, specification 4). 
As shown in Table 1, on average (unconditional mean), non-beneficiaries have 
about a one point advantage over program beneficiaries in Mathematics and language test 
scores.  The various estimates in Table 3 suggest that a large part of this gap in the case of 
mathematics and almost the entire gap in the case of language may be attributed to 
differences in observable characteristics.  Moving along the table from left to right, there is 
a decline in the test score advantage for beneficiaries. However, despite this decline, based 
on the estimates in Table 4-specification 4, prima facie it appears that program participation 
is associated with a reduction in mathematics tests scores of about one-third of a point 
while there is no effect of program participation on language test scores.   
IV estimates  
While the preceding OLS estimates control for a variety of observed characteristics, 
as argued earlier, they do not control for endogeneity of program participation.  To control 
for this we exploit the program’s allocation mechanism and create an instrument which 
allows us to obtain IV estimates of the effect of the program on test scores. First stage 
estimates of program participation using program eligibility as an instrument (equation 2), 
are provided in Table 5. Across the four specifications there is a clear effect of eligibility on 
program participation. Consistent with figure 1, regardless of the specification, program 
eligibility is associated with a 10-11 percentage point increase in the probability of receiving 
the program. The coefficient is statistically significant with F-statistics ranging from 4.7 to   16
5.3 displaying the clear effect of eligibility status on program participation. While it is clear 
that (around the cutoff point) the instrument increases the probability of program 
participation, is it likely that the instrument is not correlated with the error term in the test 
score equation? As discussed above, the instrument is a non-linear function of the Selben 
index and identifying information comes from the non-linearity imposed by the program 
design. Given this structure, there seems to be little reason to expect why, after controlling 
for observable characteristics and a flexible functional form of the Selben index, an 
arbitrarily imposed cut-off point (over which families have no control) in the Selben index 
would be correlated with unobserved characteristics that determine test scores.   
IV estimates of the effect of BDH on test scores are provided in Table 5. At first 
glance these estimates look implausibly large, positive and statistically significant. However, 
estimates based on the most comprehensive specification (Table 5-specification 4) display 
that for both mathematics and language the effect of the program on test scores is 
statistically insignificant. Although, insignificant, as compared to the OLS estimates, the IV 
estimates indicate that there is a positive relationship between program participation and 
test scores or put somewhat differently, there seems to be no evidence that program 
participation has a negative effect on test scores, for example, due to congestion effects.   
The larger IV estimates also suggest that there is a negative correlation between the errors 
in the test scores and program participation equation and that in the absence of controls 
for differences in unobserved characteristics between program beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, there would be a tendency to underestimate the impact of the program on 
test scores. 
While the IV estimates are not statistically significant, their size warrants additional 
discussion.  The IV estimate of the program on test scores is the ratio of the differences in 
average test scores and increase in the probability of participation (controlling for other 
variables) between individuals whose participation has been influenced by the assignment rule (instrument) and those unaffected by the assignment rule.
20 The IV estimate depends 
on the marginal effect of the program on the group whose probability of participation is 
affected by the assignment rule.  If the assignment rule affects a group with a high marginal 
return from the program then the IV estimate, which is the average treatment effect for 
those affected by the assignment rule, may be quite large.  In this case the large size of the 
IV estimate suggests that the group of individuals who are around the cutoff point 
experience a large increase in test scores, although the effect is not precise.   
Although not reported in the paper we experimented with limiting the sample to 
individuals around the cutoff point (± 1, 2, 3 points around the cutoff), with a linear 
specification of the Selben index, and with samples of children in grade 4.  Regardless of 
these changes, we were unable to reject the hypothesis that the program has no impact on 
test scores.  
Intention-to-treat estimates 
The IV estimates show that there is no positive and statistically significant effect of 
the program on test scores.  However, the IV estimates are local average treatment effects 
and do not rule out the possibility that the program effect is heterogeneous and may have 
an impact on test scores for individuals at lower percentiles of the Selben distribution.  
While we cannot provide average treatment effects on the treated we can provide an idea 
of the average potential effect of the program.  
Given the program assignment mechanism and based on the assumption that 
eligibility, controlling for observables and a flexible function of the Selben index is 
uncorrelated with the error term (u), a regression of test scores on program eligibility 
(reduced form estimates of the test scores equation) yields the “intention-to treat (ITT)” 
effect.  While interest usually centers on the average effect of treatment on the treated, in 
the current context the ITT estimates are clearly policy relevant.  
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20 The IV estimate of the program on test scores is the ratio of the reduced form coefficients on T in the test 
scores and participation equations.  That is, using the estimates displayed in Tables 4 and 6 (specification 4), 
we have for mathematics, 4.899= 0.486/0.097 and for language, 0.402 = 0.039/0.097.   18
From a policy perspective it would be useful to know whether the limited effect of 
the program on test scores is due to the mismatch between eligibility and program receipt 
or whether, even if the program had been allocated as envisaged there would have been no 
effect of the program on test scores.  The ITT estimates displayed in Table 6 provide an 
idea of the (minimum) average potential effect of the program on test scores had the 
program been allocated as envisaged. The estimates based on specification 4 show that 
potentially, the program exerts a positive effect on test scores. The gains are likely to be 
larger for mathematics than for language but even if allocated correctly, it appears that 
gains in test scores are not likely to be large enough to be statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  For example, even for mathematics, the estimates (Table 6, 
specification 4) show that an increase in test scores of up to 0.8 points out of 20 can be 
excluded with 95 percent probability as a potential impact estimate.  
VII. Concluding remarks  
Throughout Latin America, CCT programs play an important role in social policy. These 
programs aim to reduce poverty and to promote accumulation of human capital. On the 
educational front, several papers have shown the substantial impact of these programs on 
boosting school enrollment and ensuring regular school attendance.  While these are clearly 
the first steps to enhance educational attainment, if the aim of these programs is to build 
human capital and break the cycle of poverty then a focus beyond enrollment, on learning 
and gains in cognitive skills may also be required.  While there is a considerable body of 
work on the effect of CCT on enrollment and attendance, their effects on learning as 
measured by effects on test scores has not been as extensively examined.  
This paper contributed to the body of work on the impact of cash transfer 
programs by using information from Ecuador and by focusing on the effect of the 
program on test scores.  We exploited the program’s design and used an arguably credible 
empirical strategy to show that the BDH does not have a positive impact on test scores. 
Given the fairly large mismatch between eligibility and program receipt we also examined 
the potential effect of the program if it had been correctly allocated. The intention to treat   19
                                                
estimates suggested that even if the program had been correctly allocated, it is unlikely that 
the program would have led to an increase in test scores.   
We analyze the effect of the program on test scores a year and a half into the 
program and it is possible that these conclusions are premature and going forward, the 
program may well exert a positive effect on learning.  Alternatively, nutritional 
interventions through the BDH program for children in the age group 0-5 (children who 
are not yet in school) may lead to increases in learning. These effects have yet to be 
evaluated.  
While there is no positive impact of the program on test scores, the estimates show 
that despite the sharp increase in enrollment, there are at least no negative test score effects 
associated with the program.  Nevertheless, the results reported here suggest that while 
demand side interventions to get children to enroll and attend school are successful, 
boosting learning may require alternative and additional programs. Rather than focusing 
only on getting children to come to school, programs that also consider the supply side, for 
example, getting teachers to come to school may have a larger bearing on boosting learning 
than demand-oriented cash transfer programs.
 21  
 
21 For example, a recent report based on a nationally representative teacher tracking survey conducted in 
Ecuador in 2002, reports a teacher absenteeism rate of 14 percent (see 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/37912_Ecuador.Teacher.Absenteeism.August13.2004.
pdf, accessed on July 21, 2008. On a related note, Bedi and Marshall (2002) use data from Honduras to show 
that at least 60 percent of the schools days missed by a child during a school year may be attributed to the 
lack of supply of schooling.       20
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Table 1 
Cross tabulation between assignment rule and treatment status 
   Selben score     
Treatment status  More than 50.65  Less than 50.65  Total 
Non-beneficiaries 450  673  1,123 
Beneficiaries 201  1,271  1,472 
Total 651  1,944  2,595 
   24
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for selected variables, Full Sample 
Child and Household Characteristics  Non- 
beneficiaries  Beneficiaries Difference 
Mathematics, second grade (out of 20)  9.3761  8.5102  0.8659* 
   (0.1513)  (0.1349)  (0.2033) 
Language, second grade (out of 20)  11.1463  10.2329  0.9133* 
   (9.1411)  (0.1238)  (0.1879) 
Score in Selben index  44.1959  36.5307  7.6652* 
 (0.4288)  (0.3074)  (0.5141) 
Dummy sex (1=female) 0.4930  0.4808  0.0121 
 (0.0148)  (0.0129)  (0.0197) 
Head of the household is indigenous 0.3575  0.5655  -0.2081* 
   (0.0142)  (0.0129)  (0.0193) 
Head of the household is illiterate  0.1283  0.1771  -0.0488* 
   (0.0099)  (0.0099)  (0.0143) 
Head of the household is female  0.1306  0.1284  0.0022 
   (0.01001)  (0.0087)  (0.0133) 
Number of persons aged less than 6 in household  1.1377  1.4082  -0.2705* 
   (0.0469)  (0.0432)  (0.0643) 
Number of persons aged 6 to 17 in household   3.7702  4.3773  -0.6070* 
   (0.0941)  (0.0865)  (0.1286) 
School characteristics      
Percentage of children attending schools with one teacher 0.1368  0.1944 -0.0575* 
   (0.0102)  (0.0103)  (0.0147) 
Percentage of children attending Hispanic schools  0.7096  0.5810  0.1286* 
   (0.0135)  (0.0128)  (0.0188) 
Percentage of children residing in Quito  0.2474  0.1009  0.1465* 
   (0.0128)  (0.0078)  (0.0143) 
Percentage of children attending schools with full-time 
principal 0.2360  0.1022  0.1337* 
   (0.0126)  (0.0079)  (0.0142) 
Number of learning guides per child  0.0589  0.0568  0.0022 
   (0.0065)  (0.0052)  (0.0082) 
Percentage of children attending schools with computers  0.6947  0.5393  0.1554* 
   (0.0136)  (0.0129)  (0.0189) 
Number of books per pupil  1.5226  1.8059  -0.2832 
   (0.1177)  (0.1032)  (0.1566) 
Percentage of children attending schools with access to 
internet  0.1088 0.0457  0.063* 
   (0.0092)  (0.0054)  (0.0101) 
Index of school infrastructure (out of five)  3.7202  3.5414  0.1788* 
   (0.0252)  (0.0269)  (0.0379) 
Teacher characteristics      
Female teacher  0.6263 0.5777  0.0486* 
   (0.0143)  (0.0128)  (0.0193) 
Age of teacher (average) 37.5570  37.2374  0.3196 
   (0.30001)  (0.2702)  (0.4053) 
Educated to the superior level  0.7667  0.6967  0.0699* 
   (0.0125)  (0.0119)  (0.0175) 
Ministry of education contract 0.7921  0.7525  0.0396* 
   (0.0120)  (0.0112)  (0.0166) 
Number of training courses received by teachers (average)  6.6298  7.4055  -0.7757* 
 (0.2063)  (0.2668)  (0.3543) 
 Number of cases  1119  1469   
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. * Significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, 
and *** significant at 10 percent level. 
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Table 3 
OLS estimates of BDH on Test Scores 
Mathematics Specification  1  Specification 2  Specification 3  Specification 4 
T     -0.507**      -0.449***  -0.628*     -0.326*** 
  (0.219) (0.219) (0.213)  (0.202) 
R2 0.021 0.029 0.111  0.278 
N  2588 2588 2588  2588 
Language        
T  -0.254 -0.195 -0.228  -0.038 
  (0.198) (0.198) (0.191)  (0.184) 
R2 0.054 0.06   0.15  0.247 
N  2589 2589 2589  2589 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and corrected for heteroskedasticity. *Significant at 1 
percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, and *** significant at 10 percent level. 
 
Table 4 
Participating in BDH 
Variable  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3  Specification 4 

























Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *Significant at 1 percent 
level, ** significant at 5 percent level, and *** significant at 10 percent level. 
 
Table 5 
IV Estimates of BDH on test scores  
Mathematics  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3  Specification 4 








N  2588 2588 2588  2588 
Language        








N  2589 2589 2589  2589 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *Significant at 1 percent 
level, ** significant at 5 percent level, and *** significant at 10 percent level. 
 
Table 6 
Reduced form test score estimates  
Mathematics  Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3  Specification 4 
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *Significant at 1 percent 
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Table A1: Variables, categories and weights to construct the Selben index 
     
Using 20 
variables  Using 27 variables 
     Weights Weights 
1  Geographic area    
   Rural disperse-Country   0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Rural block- Coast   1.7868746  1.8280949 
   Rural block- Highlands   1.8031189  1.8280949 
   Urban-Coast           3.1513970  3.2713278 
   Urban-Highlands          3.9311241  3.8165491 
2  Floor    
   Others     0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Soil    0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Cane    0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Plank     1.6406758  1.5073765 
   Cement   2.7777778  2.6138550 
   Tile   5.0519818  4.9550994 
   Parquet 5.0519818  4.9550994 
3  Electricity    
   None           0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Candle             0.4385965  0.4490058 
   Private power plant    2.9564652  2.9345734 
   Public company  6.2215724  6.1577935 
4  Shower availability  n.a  
   None   0.0000000 
   Shared   1.3113652 
   Excusive   2.3537323 
5  Toilets    
   None               0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Latrine               1.0883691  0.9300834 
   Toilet and  blind well  1.4294997  1.2828736 
   Toilet and septic well   2.4691358  2.3091725 
   Toilet and sewage systems   4.2560104  4.1372675 
6  Type of cooking fuel    
   Others          0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Firewood           0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Electricity   3.8661468  3.8325850 
   Gas            3.8661468  3.8325850 
7 
  Land availability  n.a  
   No   0.0000000 
   Rented   0.7509527 
   Own   2.4321901 
8  Persons per bedroom    
   More than 4 persons     0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Between 3 and 4 persons  1.2345679  1.1866581 
   Up to 2 persons      3.6874594  3.6241180 
9 
Number of children aged under six living 
at home    
   Four or more children    0.0000000  0.0000000 
   2-3 children             2.5666017  3.1270045 
   One child              3.7037037  4.2655548 
   Don’t have any children       6.3515270  6.8473380 
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10  Members of working age without income    
   10 or more               0.0000000  0.0000000 
   7-9 members           0.2111761  0.6093650 
   5-6 members           0.9096816  1.3470173 
   3-4 members           1.9818064  2.4695318 
   1-2 members           3.9961014  4.4098781 
   All members receive incomes   6.0103964  6.3822963 
11  Head of the home spoken language     
   Indigenous language         0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Only Spanish            0.2111761  2.4855677 
   Other languages          3.2488629  3.2392559 
   Spanish and other languages    5.0032489  4.9711353 
12  Head of the home education level    
   None                  0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Alphabetization Center  0.5360624  0.5131495 
   Basic education- adults          1.3482781  1.3149455 
   Elementary School                1.7868746  1.6998076 
   High school              3.8174139  3.7203335 
   Superior-not university     5.2144250  5.0673509 
   Superior-university     5.4743340  5.3720334 
   Postgraduate               6.5951917  6.4945478 
13  Spouse education level    
   None                  0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Alphabetization Center  0.6172840  0.5291854 
   Basic education- adults          0.1461988  0.2245029 
   Elementary School                1.8518519  1.7639513 
   High school              4.1260559  4.0089801 
   Superior-not university     5.1332034  5.0513149 
   Superior-university     5.6042885  5.5484285 
   Postgraduate               6.7089019  6.8152662 
   Doesn’t have a spouse         1.7706303  1.9082745 
14 
Is the head of the home affiliated to any 
insurance    
   Not affiliated   0.0000000  0.0000000 
   Affiliated   3.4275504  3.3996151 
15  Has the household some credit  n.a  
   No     0.0000000 
   Yes   2.5891056 
16  Kitchen or kitchenette availability     
   No 0.0000000  0.0000000 
   One        5.1494477  5.0513149 
   2 o more   6.4814815  6.4304041 
17  Color TV availability    
   No        0.0000000  0.0000000 
   One       2.5990903  2.5176395 
   2 o more   4.4834308  4.4579859 
18 Refrigerator  availability    
   No        0.0000000  0.0000000 
   One       3.1676413  3.1270045 
   2 o more   4.1260559  4.1051956 
19 Telephone  n.a.  
   No   0.0000000 
   One   2.5218561 
   2 or more    3.5081820 
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20 Car  availability       
   No        0.0000000  0.0000000 
   One       4.3372320  4.2655548 
   2 o more   5.7179987  5.6606799 
21 Stereo  availability    
   No        0.0000000  0.0000000 
   One       3.0214425  2.9826812 
   2 o more   5.1332034  5.0673509 
22 VHS  availability    
   No        0.0000000  0.0000000 
   One       4.0935673  4.0410520 
   2 o more   6.0103964  5.9493265 
23  Children aged between 6-15 years who don’t go to school   
    At least one doesn’t go    0.0000000  0.0000000 
   All go          0.3573749  0.4008980 
   There are no children at home    3.5412606  3.5439384 
24  Type of school children attended    
   They don’t go to school    0.0000000  0.0000000 
   All go to a public school         0.0000000  0.0000000 
   At least one goes to a public school   0.0000000  0.0000000 
   All go to a private school    0.6335283  0.7055805 
   There are no children at home    3.3950617  3.3515074 
25  Number of children that have died  n.a.  
   4 or more          0.1120825 
   Three   0.0000000 
   Two   0.6724950 
   One   1.9614436 
   All are alive    4.8195472 
   No children at home    7.0275723 
26  Is the last child still alive  n.a.  
   No     0.0000000 
   Yes   5.9515804 
   No children at home    10.6926698 
27  Number of disabled persons at home  n.a.  
   Two or more    0.0000000 
   One   0.7509527 
   None   1.5019054 
 
 